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Title of the paper: Metaphors and image schemas in human cognition

Handed in: ~~**Summer**~~**/winter** **Year:** 2007/2008

(Indicate with a cross)

Supplementary Course
General Exam **X**
Analytical Exam
Bachelor Project

Master's degree
Cognition and Semiotics
Cognitive Aesthetics
Cognitive Linguistics
Mind and Cognition

This paper can be used by other students

Yes **X**
No

Metaphors and image schemas in human cognition

Answer to exam-question III.

Content

Amount of text: 34.912 units including spaces, excluding footnotes, table of contents and list of references.

Typographical conventions

Adapting the typological conventions found in Ungerer & Schmid (2006), conceptual metaphors will be written like this: +life is a journey+, image schemas like this: 'container' and frames: [democracy].

Introduction

Since the publication of *Metaphors We Live By*, by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson in 1980, the theory of conceptual metaphors and image schemas has received quite a lot of attention, and although the theory has also been subject to severe criticism, the field cognitive linguistic tradition has grown into a field of its own. This paper will provide an overview of the theory including a relatively detailed description of image schemas. After this, an analysis of three complex metaphors will be given, in order to show how the theory can be applied. This will show us how even the more complex and specialized metaphors rely on simple structures. To put this more schematically:

Statement of intent

How do image schemas structure our (human) conceptualization of the world? And how does image schemas relate to conceptual metaphors? How can the three metaphorical examples (1) "running for president", (2) "The deal rescues Countrywide" and (3) "she is a Houston-jumper" be analyzed in terms of conceptual metaphor theory and image schemas?

Method

In order to satisfy the statement of intent, this paper has been divided into two sections.

Section A. explains the theory of conceptual metaphors, primarily following George Lakoff and Mark Johnson's own accounts, but also taking in other authors when relevant perspectives can add to the understanding and use of the theory. The aim of section A. is to show how the concept of image schemas is connected to metaphors and what role they play in human conceptualization in general. Also the notion of frame is introduced briefly.

In section B. three metaphorical expressions will be analyzed. The three metaphorical expressions have been selected to show variety in the analyses. An expression like "running for president" is so common English that most people will never consciously think of it as being metaphorical, whereas 'Houston-jumper' is extremely specialized. This difference aside, we still expect that these expressions all rely on image schematic structures. The analyses will have a progression moving from the most obvious metaphorical relationship involved in the utterance, and then gradually uncovering the underlying mappings and correlations until arriving at the most basic image-schemas. All the examples rely heavily on cultural background knowledge, which of course is important when you want to examine if a given metaphor is universally accessible. However, since this paper is primarily concerned with image schemas, the discussion of culture has been diminished.

Section A.: Theory

The theory of conceptual metaphors has primarily been developed by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson. Following their 1980 *Metaphors we Live by* the theory has been developed by themselves in Lakoff (1990), Johnson (1990), Lakoff and Johnson (1999) and Dodge and Lakoff (2005).

Although widely criticized for inconsistencies, paradoxes (Clausner, 2005, pp. 95, 100-101), lack of philosophical grounding (Rakova, 2002, 215-244) and lack of empirical evidence (Hampe, 2005, pp. 81-112), the theory still seems powerful and interesting in its way of explaining certain language phenomena.

In order to understand the theory, we shall first have a look at the overall theory of embodiment.

Embodiment

Lakoff and Johnson have chosen the term "embodied realism" as the overall label for their viewpoint. They state that it is "a form of interactionism that is neither purely objective nor purely subjective". (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 25) This must be understood in the light of the phenomenological tradition, in which Johnson positions the theory (1990, p. xxxvii). Thus, stating that the theory is neither purely objective nor purely subjective simply tells us that we must accept that no conclusions can be exactly proven, but as the phenomenologist tradition suggests, this does not mean that we cannot make qualified suggestions about the world. Reality does not come divided up into categories that exist independent of the properties of human minds and bodies, but Lakoff and Johnson argue that since out bodies and the environments we live in are sufficiently similar, much of our conceptual system will be either universal or at least culturally shared (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 6). They state that "[...] human concepts are not just reflections of an external reality, but they are crucially shaped by our bodies and brains, especially by our sensorimotor system" (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 22). Take the example of colors: cognitive science tells us that colors do not exist in the external world, that they are not inherent in things. Color concepts are a consequence of interacting factors: lighting conditions, wavelenghts of electromagnetic radiation, color cones and neural processing. Following Lakoff and Johnson: "Color concepts are 'interactional': they arise from the interactions of our bodies, brains, the reflective properties of objects, and electromagnetic radiation" (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 24). Yet, empirical evidence found by Berlin, Kay and Rosch indicate that our conceptualization of colors is in fact relatively similar even between cultures (Ungerer & Schmid, 2006, pp. 7-14). This point to the fact that there might exist some universal structures.

To sum up: according to Lakoff and Johnson, it is crucial that we accept the fact that we have a body, and that all of our experiences from the world is perceived through our senses. Thus, patterns and structures in our perceptual system will affect the way we categorize and conceptualize our experiences. This claim will be developed further in the following sections.

Image Schemas

One of the most basic elements in the theory of conceptual metaphors is the concept of image schemas. The term image schema has been used widely and inconsistently, and no single coherent definition has yet been established (Grady, 2005, pp. 35-36). Among the authors, I believe the definition stated by Johnson is the most broad and accommodating, and I will use this definition as a starting point. As Johnson states, "[...] image schemata are not rich, concrete images or mental pictures [...]. They are structures that organize our mental representations at a level more general and abstract than that at which we form particular mental images." (Johnson, 1990, p. 23) From this we can infer that image schemas must not be too specific, and they must be abstract enough to fit many situations. E.g. a mental image of Martin Heidegger writing a book is not an image schema since it is too rich and specific. The existence of these abstract, mental image schemas can be proved experientially (Johnson, 1990, pp. 24-25).

Johnson states: "The view I am proposing is this: in order for us to have meaningful, connected experiences that we can comprehend and reason about, there must be patterns and order to our actions, perceptions and conceptions. *A schema is a recurrent pattern, shape, and regularity in, or of, these ongoing ordering activities.* These patterns emerge as meaningful structures for us chiefly at the level of our bodily movement through space, our manipulation of objects, and our perceptual interactions." (Johnson, 1990, p. 29 – original emphasis) From this, we can further infer that there must be some kind of schematic structure or pattern.

A recurrent pattern in our life is that of containment. Even as infants we experience how elements can be put into containers and taken out again. Note that this does not happen consciously – the structures emerge from our constant but unnoticed experiences with physical containment (Johnson, 1990, p. 22). Other good examples of image schemas include ‘in-out’, ‘boundary’, ‘path’ and ‘source-path-goal’. Many of these schemas constitute the basis for prepositions like “over”, “to”, “out of”, thus structuring our general conceptualization of spatial relations (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, pp. 30-36).

On this level, image schemas seem intuitive and powerful. It seems plausible that we have recurring patterns in our bodily experiences and that these patterns can be schematized. I

also seem logical that these patterns will actively shape our understanding of a given situation. However, it is difficult to assess whether these image schemas are universally accessible or grounded in our specific culture and language. Following the overall claim of the embodied realism, we must therefore look for empirical evidence, which can give us an answer to these questions.

Image schemas in babies and language

In order to show that image schemas can exist universally, Jean M. Mandler has conducted a series of cognitive experiments on babies. Because the babies are so young that they have not yet learned a language and are less biased by the particularities of culture, it is possible to find some universal schematic structures. (Mandler, 2005, p. 138) She mentions two important findings: (1) Nine month old babies are able to distinguish a model of an airplane from a model of a bird with outstretched wings. This point to the fact that the baby is able to conceptualize both the experience of birds as animate objects and airplanes as inanimate and link the models to each concept (Mandler, 2005, p. 141). (2) Preverbal babies from both English- and Korean-speaking homes are able to make the distinction between tight-fit and loose-fit, but only Korean-speaking adults make this distinction intuitively (Mandler, 2005, pp. 153-156). Her conclusion is that the preverbal mind seems to be able to connect experiences in the world, e.g. birds flying, to static models of birds – this is similar to what Johnson refers to as the 'link' schema (Johnson, 1990, pp. 117-119). Also, it seems that we have a rich inventory of image schemas which can be used to distinguish various elements from each other, e.g. 'animate-inanimate' and 'tight-fit-loose-fit'. A language utilizes only a subset of these schemas, and different language use different subsets.

Due to the use of different languages, some of these schemas are used more than others, and for instance the schematic distinction between tight fit and loose fit, is often ignored by native English speakers because this distinction is not used in the language.

Relating schemas: The 'locomotion' image schema

Image schemas are not to be understood as unrelated and discrete units. As Lakoff and Dodge note, image schemas are mapped neurologically to so-called secondary brain areas, which basically connect our different perceptual modalities, i.e. visual, auditory, sensory, etc. Since the brain is massively interconnected, we find many of the same primitive image schematic structures in different experiences, and many experiences are interpreted through more than one schema (Dodge & Lakoff, 2005, pp. 84-85). Thus, we can say that image schemas are connected. A good example of how image schemas are connected is to see how the 'containment' schema relies on simpler schemas like 'in-out' and 'boundary'.

In Dodge and Lakoff they derive a 'locomotion' image schema, suggesting an image schematic structure where differentiation is done on these parameters: goal, path, involved body-parts, gait, speed and effort. Thus running and walking can be distinguished in terms of speed. Walking a stony mountain path and a plain sidewalk is distinguished in terms of the effort involved. Crawling and walking is distinguished in part by the body-parts involved. Wandering can be distinguished from other types of movement, through the lack of any specific goal (Dodge & Lakoff, 2005, pp. 72-84).

The interesting point is that this 'locomotion' schema is abstract enough to encompass all types of bodily movement, and place in relation to each other, along the axes.

Event-structures as image schemas

Although the concept of event-categories is introduced by Ungerer and Schmid while dealing with categorization, they willingly admit that the same concept can be explained in terms of an image schema, which is what I will do here (Ungerer & Schmid, 2006, pp. 108-109). Events are introduced in order to assemble objects (e.g. 'soup' and 'bowl') with actions (e.g. 'eating') into events (e.g. 'supper', 'dinner' or more abstractly 'a meal') (Ungerer & Schmid, 2006, pp. 105-106).

Thus, my claim here is that an event-category in this sense can also fit the broad definition of image schemas, as proposed by Johnson above. It is not too rich and specific. Take the event of a rescue, which will also be used in the analysis. In the simplest case we have five schematic roles: a rescuer, someone or something to be rescued, a threat to be rescued from, the performed action of rescuing, and it might even involve some objects used in performing the rescue. This simple schematic structure can fit all kinds of rescues from drowning accidents (in the sea or in a pool), fire, a shooting battle, a bomb, someone about to fall and many others. Some of these situations we have only experienced through movies and television, e.g. the rescue from a ticking bomb, while others like the event of stumbling on our own legs and almost falling, which we can experience quite often. In some cases the rescuer must possess some kind of human agency in order to perform the action, e.g. when a life guard rescues someone from drowning, she directs her body to perform the necessary actions, e.g. swimming, grabbing, dragging and while back on ground, doing CPR.

Summing up: image schemas can be defined in a broad sense, as generic schematic structures of recurrent patterns, which emerge from our bodily experience in the world. We have seen examples of how 'boundaries' and 'containment' is structuring spatial relations. We have also seen how our different ways of moving around can be schematized as 'locomotion' involving our gait, speed, effort etc. These schemas will be useful in the analyses.

Metaphor

Traditionally, the term metaphor has been used in literary criticism to describe certain types of figurative speech where one word is explained in terms of another. In this view, the conventionalized metaphors have normally been ignored because they are thought to be 'dead'. A phrase like "her mouth was a rose" has been analyzed so many times that it is no longer interesting. In addition to this, our language is full of words and concept which are actually metaphorical – we are just so used to them that they have become lexicalized, i.e. part of our everyday vocabulary. According to the view proposed by Lakoff and Johnson, these taken-for-granted metaphors are the most important, since they represent a way of thinking. (Ungerer & Schmid, 2005, pp. 116-119).

In order to analyze the metaphors, Lakoff and Johnson introduces three terms: target domain, source domain and mapping. The target domain is the domain we want to understand and the source domain is the concept from which we draw our knowledge. Elements from the source domain are then mapped to corresponding elements in the target domain (Lakoff, 2006, pp. 188-191; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, pp. 45-46).

The most basic kind of metaphor is coined primary metaphor by Lakoff and Johnson. These metaphors exist as correlations between very basic perceptual experiences. According to the theory this correlation arises from conflation: For young children sensorimotor experiences and subjective experiences and judgments are so regularly conflated (undifferentiated in experience) that for a certain time children do not distinguish between the two experiences when they occur together. E.g. the subjective experience of affection is typically correlated with the sensory experience of the warmth of being hold. During the period of conflation, associations are automatically built up between the two domains. Only later, during the period of differentiation, children are able to separate the two domains, but the cross-domain associations persist. These persisting associations are the mappings of primary metaphors. (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 47-49)

Examples of primary metaphors include: +help is support+, +knowing is seeing+ and +purposes are desired objects+ (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, pp. 52-53).

What is also important here is that the primary metaphors provide the basis for the learning of conceptual metaphors. Subsequent to the conflation experience, the child is able to differentiate the two conceptual domains, which allow conceptual metaphors to emerge (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 48).

All these primary metaphors are directly connected to basic sensory experiences (seeing objects move, sensing warmth) however, these are not the only metaphors we have.

Take the example discussed by Lakoff and Johnson +love is a journey+. Here, the abstract concept of love is to be understood through the less abstract concept of journeys (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, pp. 63-65). However, a journey does not relate directly to any single perceptual experience, and thus, this is not a primary metaphor. They propose that we conceptualize and reason about a concept in terms of the metaphor used to express it in language. Thus, since our notion of time is conceptualized in terms of money, time can be 'wasted' (Ungerer & Schmid, 2005, pp. 116-119).

Summing up: primary metaphors, as described by Lakoff and Johnson, are mappings between basic sensory experiences like observing movement or sensing warmth and abstract concepts like time and affection. Conceptual metaphors consists of two domains (source and target) between which a mapping is established. Through this mapping we can talk, think and reason about the target domain, relying on our experience in the source domain.

Mappings in complex conceptual metaphors

Metaphors help us understand abstract concepts like time and love in terms of more tangible concepts like money and journeys, but why is it that the mapping is established like this? (Johnson, 1990, p. 113). There are three factors determining and constraining how mappings are established: (1) image schemas, (2) basic correlations, i.e. primary metaphors, and (3) cultural evaluations (Ungerer & Schmid, 2006, pp. 119-121). However, it is the structure of the source-domain, which also determines the structure of the target (Johnson, 1990, p. 113).

Johnson uses the example +purposes are physical goals+ metaphor, and note that the source-domain (physical goals) is structured by the 'path' image schema. The 'path' schema is very common, founded on constant and basic bodily experience. It is pervasive in experience and therefore well-understood. It is well-structured and simply-structured, and it is emergent and well-demarcated by virtue of the above. (Johnson, 1990. p. 116)

According to Johnson, an experiential correlation, i.e. a primary metaphor, between source domain (moving along paths) and target (achievement of purpose) results in a natural mapping.[1] This experiential correlation also determines what gets mapped onto what (start-of-path to initial state etc.). So the mapping here is governed primarily by the primary metaphor, however, it is the 'source-path-goal' schema which governs the structure of our metaphorical understanding of purposes (Johnson, 1990. p. 116).

Summing up, we have now seen how the image schematic structure of the source domain plays a crucial role in the mapping between source- and target domain.

[1] Although Johnson does not use the term primary metaphor, this is basically the same.

Frames

The notion of frame comes from Charles Fillmore, and it was originally defined simply as a collection of related words (Ungerer & Schmid, 2006, pp. 207-209). He later redefined it as a cognitive structure which you need knowledge about in order to understand the meaning encoded in the collected words. E.g. you need knowledge of the [commercial event] structure in order to understand words like buy, sell etc. A difference between the words, is how the point our attention to different aspects, i.e. the word 'buy' puts attention to the (action of the) buyer and secondly the object bought (Ungerer & Schmid, 2006, pp. 209-212).

Section B.: Analysis

In this section, three metaphorical examples will be analyzed to see how image schemas play an important role in structuring our understanding and conceptualization.

Example 1

In order to become president of the United States of America, you "run for president".[2] Of course the concepts of president and election are parts of a [democracy]-frame, which is grounded in our western culture. In this section I will give an explanation to why "run" is used instead of some other verb.

Let us first examine the two domains involved in this metaphor. The target domain is that of a presidential election, which is a two-year process primarily consisting of the campaign, which culminates in the actual election where the citizens give their vote. Campaigning is primarily made up of publishing a book, giving speeches, paying visits to local communities (where candidates must eat the local food[3]) and participating in debates on television. This complex system of actions and events is conceptualized metaphorically through the source domain.

The source-domain however can be seen in two ways. Either, "run for" refers to the motion activity of running after a (fast) moving object. Alternately, it can refer to a running competition, stretching over two years. In the 'competition' schema we have opponents, a goal which is to win the race, and as a race progresses we can see how each participant is doing compared to the others. Both of these source domains seem highly plausible in explaining

[2] Compare this to examples in Danish where you usually 'stand up' (as a potential candidate) and you 'go to the election' (with some kind of political statement and plan).

[3] See http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/23/us/politics/23food.html?_r=1&oref=slogin

why "run" is used in conceptualizing a presidential election, and a detailed analysis will be given on both accounts.

The first understanding of run will yield a metaphor like this: +becoming president of the US is chasing a fast-moving object+ (thus, running is necessary). Remember that it is the structure of the source domain and the primary metaphors which determines and constrains the mapping. Here, the overall structure is a 'chasing'-schema, with an object, someone chasing it, a path between the object and the chaser, and the physical motion of moving after the object, in this case running.

Mappings are established between the goal of the campaign: to be elected, and the goal of chasing the fast-moving object: to catch it. The activities of campaigning, e.g. giving speeches, eating local food etc. are integrated into an overall mapping with the physical movements involved in running. This is a very clear example of how the source domain structures the target: since there is only one slot in the 'chasing'-schema for the actions performed by the chaser (physical movement), all the various activities of doing the campaign are integrated and mapped to running. Competing candidates are not mapped to anything, in this metaphor, and thus are not subject to any particular attention – again as a result of the schematic structure of the source domain.

Note how the concept of running, in the 'locomotion' schema, is an effortful movement, compared to walking or strolling, and from this metaphorical mapping we can easily infer that the campaigning activities together require quite a lot of effort from the candidate.

In the second understanding, we might put it like this: +becoming president of the US is a running competition+ (e.g. a marathon). The source domain is thus structured by a 'competition' schema. Mappings are established between the candidates and the runners, thus other candidates are seen as opponents, and the candidate who is actually elected, is mapped to the winner of the race. Any other mappings cannot be consistently elaborated from this simple example, but you can easily imagine how someone can talk about obstacles for each candidate.

In order to explain this mapping, we must examine the image schemas involved in a running competition. One very important schema is the 'source-path-goal' schema – all participants must run from the same starting point, follow the same path and reach the same goal (or at least run on parallel but otherwise identical paths). Also, following our overall 'competition' schema we have as a group of participants trying to win.

Although some of the mappings and schemas I have proposed here could also be seen in other ways, I think the important point is to see how attention in this case is pointed to the other candidates, and the most relevant inference we can make from it, is that we can ac-

tually measure how each candidate is doing in relation to the other – just as we can see how runners in a race can be ahead of or behind another runner. Considering how much attention is paid to all kinds of polls, this seems to be a very important aspect of our conceptualization of an election.

Additionally one might argue that in the [political-election]-frame, the metaphorical use of 'running' puts focus on the actions performed by the candidate. He or she is responsible for being elected. One could easily claim that this view poses a threat to the understanding of democracy since there is no focus on the voters in the frame. By using a phrase like "he was elected" will put indirect attention to the fact that it was someone else who was in charge of what happened – the collective voice of voters.

Example 2

Countrywide is the largest mortgage lender in the US, and has recently been acquired by Bank of America, the largest consumer bank in the US, which led the New York Times to print that "The deal rescues Countrywide". The metaphor involved in a sentence like this, seems relatively obvious: +a purchase of a company is a rescue operation+. However, given the fact that purchases of companies can also be conceptualized differently (e.g. "corporate takeover" or "hostile takeover" stressing the hostile intentions, or "acquisition" stressing the value that the purchased company contributes with) I am not proposing this metaphor to be the established understanding of the situation. Rather, it is a way in which the newspaper can show their interpretation of the situation. Yet, this does not explain why the utterance actually makes sense. In this section I'll give an analysis of the mappings involved.

One way of describing the metaphor is to examine the target domain of a purchase within a [commercial event] frame. However, a purchase of a company is not identical to a general purchase, although it of course is related to this. When purchasing a company there are more actors involved than in the prototypical exchange between a merchant and a buyer. A company might be owned by several shareholders, the price is not fixed, and a company is not a simple commodity or physical object, but is instead made up of employees, knowledge, structures of organization and physical building and production facilities. This structure is far too complex, and as noted in the theory section, it is the schematic structure of the source domain which determines the actual mapping. Therefore, we must use the structure of a prototypical 'rescue operation'. We see that the role of rescuer is assigned to Bank of America, while the rescued is of course Countrywide. The rescuing-action is mapped to the purchase. The threat, from which Countrywide is rescued, is probably some kind of financial crisis, but this seems to be less important in this case. As in the previous example

we clearly see how the schematic structure of the source domain determines the structure of the metaphor.

In order to explain why the mappings are established as they are, we must examine the relationship between the rescuer and the rescued in the 'rescue' situation and the buyer and the company bought in the purchase of company. In this case we seem to rely on our basic understanding of buying, in which it is the buyer who acts and the object bought is just passively changing owners.[4] This explains why the rescuer is mapped to Bank of America.

As noted briefly in the beginning of this section, the fact that the journalist has chosen to use the metaphorical term 'rescue' to describe a financial transaction, is not just a simple statement. The schematic structure of the 'rescue' event allows us to assign different roles to each participating actor, and from this we can infer that Bank of America is the hero/rescuer. This can seem pointless to point out, but I think it is actually interesting how you can manipulate a conception of an entity (e.g. a company, a product or a politician) by using metaphorical expressions that assign certain schematic roles to the involved actors – even when these are absent in the actual sentence, as in this case where the background story is explained separately. Instead of using the term "rescue" the journalist could have chosen to put it like "Bank of America has acquired Countrywide" or "Countrywide escapes bankruptcy". These examples yield quite different understandings of the exact same situation.

Example 3

In a downtown Manhattan coffee shop, you might hear a cool-looking guy whisper to his friend that "she is a Houston-jumper", as a girl enters. The term Houston-jumper is an extremely specialized term, only used among members of a very small, local group of people living in SoHo, New York. It describes the behavior of NYU students and other people who usually hang around in the Washington Square area, although they would actually rather be part of the more trendy SoHo-area and thus chooses to cross Houston Street.

The term relies on a background frame, which involves downtown Manhattan geography – the fact that Houston-street constitutes the border between Greenwich Village to the north and SoHo, the area south of Houston Street. It also relies on the concept of national borders, and in the US, especially the southern border to Mexico, where the term "jumping the

[4] I can only think of the example of stolen goods, in which case you can talk about it as "changing hands" – as if the goods had a will of their own.

border" refers to how illegal immigrants, by means of physically jumping over the fence, enter the US.[5]

In the term Houston-jumper, the target domain is the border between two Manhattan neighborhoods, which is to be understood through the source domain of the national border between the US and Mexico. Involved in this utterance, we can thus find metaphors like +a neighborhood is a country+ and +a border between neighborhoods is a national border+. In these metaphors we find a very clear case of image schematic structuring of mappings, since the both the source and target domains fit the simple 'boundary' schemas. We can map the border between SoHo and Greenwich Village to the border between the US and Mexico.

The more troublesome part of course is figuring out if SoHo should be mapped to Mexico or the US. When looking at the actual use of the term by people living in SoHo, it is easily seen that just as the US is the desired destination of the Mexican border-jumpers. In this case, the metaphor must be elaborated from the 'boundary' schema and into a structure of a 'container', where the inside is the goal in a 'source-path-goal' schema. It is clear that the US is the inside of the 'container' since no one would jump the border to get OUT of the US. In the same way, SoHo is the desired destination of the Houston-jumpers. However, this explanation is not satisfying enough, since it doesn't explain why Greenwich Village-people don't use the same term to refer to SoHo-people jumping Houston Street to get to the village.

Here I find it beneficial to look at how the Manhattan neighborhoods are defined. Greenwich Village does have boundaries to other neighborhoods, but it's not defined in language in terms of these borders. Instead it is defined as an area surrounding a landmark, which in this case is Washington Square Park. SoHo, on the other hand is explicitly defined in terms of its location south of Houston Street, and thus Houston Street is a landmark which is included in the language term (Of course it has other borders too, but these are less well-defined. Some would argue that the western border is 6th Avenue, but the eastern border could be either Broadway, Crosby Street or even Lafayette Street).

Looking at the people who are usually identified with the two neighborhoods, will also help us explain why Greenwich Village must be mapped to Mexico. Although it is far from all the students attending New York University who also live in Greenwich Village, during the daytime, a large share of the people populating the streets are students. One could of course

[5] It can be argued that this concept constitutes a metonymic part-whole relation, where only a small part (actually jumping over the fence) stands for the whole action-chain (illegally immigrating to the US). However, since this is only background knowledge I will not discuss it further here.

argue that students who can afford the $35.000 yearly tuition plus the high living expenses in New York City, does not classify as poor, but on the other hand: after tuition has been paid, and food has been consumed, there might not be much left for anything else. Compared to the luxury-fashion shoppers who populate the streets of SoHo, they must be considered poor. The SoHo-shoppers are wealthy to the point of filthy-rich, and in the frame of [the american dream], wealth and success are closely correlated. This correlation between relative wealth in Greenwich Village/SoHo and Mexico/the US, further underlines the mapping.

What I think is most interesting, however, is that the use of the term is not just a degrading label which can be assigned to other people. Using this metaphorical term also implicitly reinforces the notion of SoHo as a better neighborhood, due to the mapping to the US-Mexico-border. Although this metaphor is highly specialized and far from lexicalized, it is still based on the same, simple image schemas of 'boundary' and 'source-path-goal'.

Conclusion

In the broad definition of image schemas, they are abstract schematic structures of recurrent patterns in the ongoing ordering activities of our perceptual experiences. These image schemas play an important role in our metaphorical understanding of the word, since the schematic structure of the source domain in a conceptual metaphor (both primary and complex) is imposed onto the target domain.

From the analysis of example 1 we clearly see how a conventionalized metaphorical expression can be analyzed. We can see that the image schematic structure of the running as an effortful motion activity seems naturally correlated to the two-year marathon process of a presidential campaign. We also see how our understanding in the 'competition' schema actively shapes our conceptual understanding of the metaphorical concept and allows us to make inferences, thus giving sense to the concept of a political poll prior to the actual election. In the less conventionalized example 2, we see how the choice of metaphor used by a journalist, indirectly guides (or forces) our interpretation of a given situation, by assigning schematic roles to participating actors. Even in the far-fetched and specialized example 3, we see that the complex network of implicit meanings are still based on simple image schematic structures of 'boundary', 'containment' and 'source-path-goal'.

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